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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
plaintiff predicate liability on the theory of breach of warranty in order
to impose strict liability on the manufacturer. Thus, the assault upon the
citadel continues, and one can anticipate that other jurisditcions will follow
the precedent set out by Greenman and Suvada. Strict tort liability is a
revolutionary concept and surely is "the law of the immediate future."3 9
Robert Breakstone
39 Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., supra note 29.
TRUSTS-TOTTEN TRUST-INITIAL ILLINOIS
RECOGNITION
For a number of years, the decedent, Antonio Petralia, was the sole
owner of a savings account in his own name at the First National Bank
of Chicago. On November 8, 1948, he closed this account and transferred
all funds therein to an account in his own name as Trustee for his daugh-
ter, Dominica DiMaggio. 1 From the time the account was opened to the
date of his death, Antonio Petralia had, and exercised, the power to make
deposits and withdrawals from the account. At the death of Antonio
Petralia, the beneficiary of the trust instituted a citation proceeding
against the administrator of the estate, claiming title to the account. The
probate court entered a decree in favor of the beneficiary, and it was
affirmed by the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
decree on the grounds that a valid and enforceable inter vivos trust was
created since the beneficiary had acquired a present interest during the
lifetime of the decedent. In re Petralia, 32 111. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
This decision marks the first judicial recognition of the tentative, or
"Totten" Trust, in Illinois. A tentative trust was first defined in New
York 2 and is now incorporated in the Restatement of Trusts.3 This note
I Signature card showed the words "Tony Petralia, Trustee" on the front, and on
the reverse side the following language: "All the deposits in this account are made
for the benefit of Domenica DiMaggio to whom or to whose legal representative said
deposits or any part thereof together with the interest thereon, may be paid in the
event of the death of the undersigned trustee."
21n re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904): "A savings bank trust
is a deposit by one person of his in his own name as trustee for another. Such a deposit,
standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the de-
positor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or com-
pletes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery
of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the
beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance,
the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand
at the death of the depositor."
3 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 58 (2d ed. 1958).
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will consider the judicial reasoning behind the court's decision to adopt
the Totten Trust and will explore some of the case law of other states
recognizing such trusts.
Two problems were faced by the court in adopting the Totten Trust
in this situation. First, there was no evidence that the settlor intended
to create a trust, other than the language on the bank's signature card,
which the decedent executed. The court held that this was sufficient evi-
dence to show such an intent, and pointed out that the wording of the
card followed the language of an Illinois statute which states that the
funds on deposit in a savings bank trust account shall be paid to the bene-
ficiary on the depositor's death.4 It should be noted that savings bank trust
agreements of a similar or identical wording had been held to create valid
trusts in previous Illinois cases,5 but the trusts were deemed irrevocable
on the basis of extrinsic evidence showing such intent.,
The second problem, the source of difficulty for many courts and the
subject of considerable comment by legal writers, 7 is whether the trust
exists from the time of the original deposit, subject to pro tanto revocation
by later withdrawals, or has the settlor reserved so much control that a
valid trust exists only from the time of his death. Unless the cestui acquires
a beneficial or equitable interest during the life of the settlor, and a valid
inter vivos trust is created, the Totten Trust should be void as an at-
tempted testamentary disposition which fails to conform to the Statute of
Wills.
New York has decided, in two cases specifically treating this second
problem, that no trust arises until the death of the depositor. In the case
of In re U.S. Trust Co.,8 a father opened two savings accounts in trust
for his son. The father retained the pass books and no deposits or with-
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 161, S 145 (1963). Such statutes exist in almost all states, but
solely for the protection of banks, and have never been interpreted by the courts as
legislative recognition of this type of trust. See 1 Scow, LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 487,
n. 7 (2d ed. 1956, amended by pocket part 1965).
5 "There must be hundreds of individual trust accounts in Chicago banks which
have used this or similar forms. Countless depositors, who have the right to make
withdrawals at will and to close out their accounts, have designated themselves as
trustees in the belief that the beneficiary named by them will receive whatever balance
remains in their accounts at their death. That so few cases involving these accounts
have reached our reviewing courts is surprising and is evidence of their general ac-
ceptance." In re Joseph's Estate, 30 Ill. App. 2d 492, 493, 175 N.E.2d 265, 265 (1961).
6 Estate of Helfrich, 1 T.C. 590, aff'd, 143 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1944); Albert v. Albert,
334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E.2d 69 (1948); In re Joseph's Estate, supra note 5; In re Hauser's
Estate, 40 IMI. App. 2d 150, 189 N.E.2d 370 (1963).
TSee, e.g., Comment, 6 DE PAUL L. REv. 117 (1956); 14 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 63
(1958); 42 N.C.L. REv. 214 (1963).
8 117 App. Div. 178, 102 N.Y.S. 271 (1907), aff'd mem. 189 N.Y. 500, 81 N.E. 1177
(1907).
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drawals were made. Under New York law, perfect tentative trusts were
established. However, the beneficiary predeceased the settlor, and the
court held that "until the depositor's death the funds on deposit are im-
pressed with no trust in the sense that any title thereto, actual and benefi-
cial, vests in the proposed beneficiary unless the depositor shall have
completed the gift. . . ." This principle was affirmed recently in the case
of In re City Savings and Loan Association,0 wherein the court held that
the settlor of the trust was entitled to vote the shares in the trust as "the
accounts are ... his both legally and equitably."" Courts in a few other
states have come to the same conclusion as New York in holding Totten
Trusts invalid. 12 In Fleck v. Baldwin, 3 a woman died intestate, leaving
an estate of nearly $400,000, most of which was in savings bank trust
accounts for her sisters and brothers. The court, although expressing sym-
pathy for the petitioners, refused to recognize the accounts as trusts, say-
ing there had been no gift of any interest to the supposed beneficiaries,
and that "no trust is created, for an imperfect gift will not be enforced
as a trust merely because of its imperfection."'14
The Illinois decision is in accord with the viewpoint of the majority of
states which have recognized the Totten Trust. 5 These states hold that a
present interest is created in the beneficiary during the lifetime of the
settlor. This is consistent with a line of cases in Illinois which has ruled
that inter vivos revocable trusts, created by formal instruments, are valid
despite a reservation of powers of a very broad scope in the settlor.' 6 In
the recent case of Farkas v. Williams,17 which the Illinois Supreme Court
cites as support of its decision in the instant case, it was held that an
9 Id. at 179, 102 N.Y.S. at 272.
10 123 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1953). 111d. at 858.
12 Springvale National Bank v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 119 Atl. 529 (1923); Bartlett v.
Remington, 59 N.H. 364 (1879); Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (1905);
Travers v. Reid, 119 N.J. Eq. 416, 182 At. 908 (1936); In re Estate of Hoffman, 175
Ohio St. 363, 195 N.E.2d 106 (1963); Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975
(1943).
13 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943). 14 Id. at 978.
15 Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E.2d 199 (1939); Coughlin v. Farmers &
Mechanics Savings Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937); In re Shapley's Deed
of Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946); In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 575, 296
P.2d 518 (1956); Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A.2d 383
(1943). For other cases recognizing Totten Trusts, but saying nothing on this specific
point, see Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W.2d 2 (1950); Bollock v. Bollock, 169
Md. 407, 182 Atl. 317 (1935); Kuck v. Raferty, 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P.2d 552 (1931).
10 Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 47, 54 N.E. 615 (1899); Bear v. Milliken Trust Co., 336
I1l. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 356 111. 612, 191
N.E. 250 (1934); Farkas v. Williams, 5 111. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
17 Supra note 16.
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enforceable corporate stock trust was created even though the written
agreement reserved to the settler the right to receive all cash dividends,
to change the beneficiary, and to revoke any part of the trust by selling
any part of the stock in trust and retaining the proceeds. In addition, the
agreements stated that if the beneficiary predeceased the settlor, the trust
was automatically revoked. Because of this liberal attitude, the court had
an ample basis for recognizing Totten Trusts as valid.
Nevertheless, a tentative trust is far different from a revocable trust
created under a formal agreement. Withdrawal of any of the funds in the
account is held to be a pro tanto revocation of the trust,18 and if the bene-
ficiary should predecease the settlor, no rights pass to his estate.10 The
Totten Trust can be successfully attacked both before2° and after2' the
death of the settlor on the theory of an implied fraud on the creditors,
although, presumably at least, all other available assets of the estate would
first have to be subjected to the creditor's claims. The trust is also pre-
sumed to be revoked to the extent necessary to pay the burial expenses
and costs of administration. 22 The effectiveness of the trust, theoretically
rendered absolute on the settlor's death, is also subject, to some extent,
to the terms of his will. The trust is considered revoked not only where the
depositor expressly disposes of the deposit in his will in favor of some
other person than the beneficiary, 23 but also where the dispositions made
in his will would be ineffective if the trust were not revoked. 24 The trust
is not affected, however, by a bequest of the residue of the depositor's
estate.25 Since the trust takes effect in possession and enjoyment only on
the death of the depositor, it is included in the depositor's estate for the
purpose of both federal 26 and state27 taxation.
lsVierling v. Ellwood City Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 356 Pa. 350, 52 A.2d 224
(1947); In re Ingel's Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 92 A.2d 881 (1952).
19 Hyman v. Tarplee, 64 Cal. App.2d 805, 149 P.2d 453 (1944). See also, In re Reich,
146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (1933).
20 Workmen's Comp. Bd. v. Furman, 106 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1951); Banca D'ltalia &
Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super 452, 36 A.2d 242 (1944).
21 Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N.Y.S. 529 (1908); In re Reich,
146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (1933).
22 In re Greniewich, 243 App. Div. 811, 278 N.Y.S. 279 (1935); In re Aybar, 203
Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1952).
23 Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. 106 (1933).
24 Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 106 Misc. 628, 176 N.Y.S. 418 (1919),
aff'd 192 App. Div. 908, 182 N.Y.S. 956 (1920), aff'd 233 N.Y. 512, 135 N.E. 897 (1922);
In re Beagan, 112 Misc. 292, 183 N.Y.S. 941 (1920).
25 In re Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 At. 209 (1936).
26 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S§ 20.2036, 20.2038.
2 7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, S 375 (1963).
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The law is clear and consistently followed in most jurisdictions on these
points, but the important question of what evidence is sufficient to show
that the decedent intended an irrevocable trust,2 8 or intended no trust at
all,29 is a matter of pleading and proof in the individual case. So also is the
question of whether the surviving spouse may include the trust in deter-
mining her distributive share of the estateA0 These are problems which
could result in considerable future litigation for the courts. Nevertheless,
as a means of bringing many uncomplicated estates within the "small
estates" law,31 at a savings of considerable time and money, 32 the value of
the Totten Trust cannot be doubted.
James Sheridan
28 See, e.g., Farrell v. Cohalan, 398 N.Y. 129, 81 N.E.2d 51 (1948) (delivery of the
pass book); Slepkow v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 210, 172 AtI. 328 (1934) (informing bene-
ficiary of the trust).
29 See, e.g., Rush v. South Brooklyn Savings Institution, 65 Misc. 66, 119 N.Y.S.
726 (1909) (attempted withdrawal of funds, though prevented by bank rule requiring
60-day notice); Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W.2d 589 (1943) (marked copies
of the trust agreement "destroyed").
30 In re Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951) (requiring proof that the trust
was illusory). See generally, 53 ILL. BAR. J. 918 (1965).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 324 (1963). Limited to estates of less than $5000, it provides
a quick informal distribution of the estate, even where the decedent died intestate.
32 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 90 (1963). If an estate is opened, a minimum of 9 months
is required before closing.
